John Searle's 1980 thought experiment claims that running a program, however convincing its output, cannot give a computer real understanding of language.
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John Searle's 1980 thought experiment claims that running a program, however convincing its output, cannot give a computer real understanding of language.
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Parfit used the teletransporter to argue that no further fact makes someone the same person over time. What matters is psychological connection and continuity, which he called Relation R.
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It is the question of why physical processes in the brain come with subjective experience, a puzzle that explaining brain functions does not appear to settle.
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Language models are trained to predict words. Researchers disagree on whether this yields understanding, and the answer depends on how meaning and understanding are defined.
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Compatibilism holds that free will and moral responsibility can coexist with determinism. Neuroscience has not settled the free will question, though it may inform responsibility.
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Frank Jackson's 1982 thought experiment imagines a color-vision scientist raised in black and white. It asks whether she learns something new on seeing color, a question aimed at physicalism.
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A philosophical zombie is an imagined being physically identical to a human but with no conscious experience. Philosophers use it to test whether physical facts can explain consciousness.
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The binding problem asks how separate brain circuits processing different features produce one unified experience. It is really several distinct problems, and the experiential version remains unsolved.
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Nagel argued that conscious experience is essentially subjective, so physical descriptions of the brain leave out what it is like to be a creature. He did not claim physicalism is false.
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Panpsychism is the view that mind or consciousness is fundamental and widespread in nature. Most versions say the tiniest parts of things have it, not that rocks think.
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Split-brain studies showed that cutting the corpus callosum splits much perception, yet patients act like one person. Whether consciousness itself divides is unresolved.
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Alan Turing's 1950 test asks whether a machine can converse so humanly that a judge cannot reliably tell it from a person. Whether passing shows real intelligence is disputed.
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Blindsight is the ability of some people with damage to the primary visual cortex to detect or locate stimuli in their blind field without conscious seeing. Its cause and meaning are still debated.
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Libet found brain activity began hundreds of milliseconds before people reported the urge to move. Whether this undermines free will is disputed, and later work has weakened the inference.
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The mind-body problem asks how mental life relates to physical states. Positions divide mainly into dualism and physicalism, with idealism and several sub-views, and each faces its own difficulty.
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Integrated information theory says consciousness is a system's integrated cause-effect structure, measured as phi. It is controversial because critics call it untested and unfalsifiable, while defenders disagree.
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